Billions of dollars have
been wasted on claims of a massive increase of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the
Earth's atmosphere and entire careers, organizations, and government and
non-governtal agencies have been financed to advance the hoax. So much depends on this cash flow that the
fraud's machinery continues to function.
What is perhaps the
biggest hoax in history is unravelling before us today. It has been a terrible and destructive fraud
on the people. ... This hoax has resulted in bad policies and a tremendous
unnecessary expense to the world. Those
responsible should receive just punishment and ridicule for their
misdeeds.
A hoax is a deceptive act
intended to hoodwink people through deliberate misinformation, including
factual omissions. ... The central lie is that we are experiencing a known
human-caused climate crisis, a claim based on speculative theories, contrived
data and totally unproven modelling predictions. And the evidence? Much is revealed by politically corrupted
processes and agenda-driven report conclusions rendered by the United Nations
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which are trumpeted in the
media and NGOs as authoritative gospel.
Dr. Michael Mann's
infamous "hockey stick" graph, which purported to show steady
temperatures on Earth for around a millennium until the 20th century, is the
source of much of the misguided hysteria as it had been falsified many times
over. Then again the Al Gore and WWF
prediction of polar bears getting extinct because of climate change was
falsified. So is Greenpeace's prediction of ice-free Arctic summers.
Now the recent Italian
courts convicting scientists for false predictions have re-kindled debate
whether this is the right step and need to curb such hoaxes and false
predictions
(Roger Pielke Jr.'s Blog)
The verdict in the lawsuit brought against scientists L'Aquila has prompted
much discussion and debate. Following the initial poor reporting of the case
and its context has followed some much better coverage. For instance, the
Chronicle of Higher Education, the New Scientist, David Ropeik writing at
Scientific American, and some colleagues of mine at Macquarie University
writing at The Conversation have all added valuable context and nuance to this
discussion.
Yet, some in the US
scientific community, especially officials at AAAS and AGU continue to wax
hyperbolic on this issue. For example,
"You risk losing
valuable information from experts who would rather spend time in the lab than
in prison," said Mark S. Frankel, director of the scientific-responsibility
program of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
"We are hearing
concerns from our members," added Christine W. McEntee, executive director
of the American Geophysical Union. "This isn't just about earthquakes but
about hurricanes and tsunamis too." . . .
But even though the
decision will be appealed, doling out convictions and prison time will have a
chilling effect on scientists, said Mr. Frankel of the AAAS.
"There is so much
uncertainty in science that the best advice still might not be the right
advice," he said. With a ruling like this, "some scientists may fear
participating in any public-policy process. I already hear from scientists who
say that policy is so difficult that they'd be better off in the lab."
Such concerns are vastly
overblown, and it is curious to see US scientific societies (mis)appropriating
the narrative of the L'Aquila saga as part of their own political battles.
In 2002, Bobbie Klein, a
lawyer by training and long-time colleague here at the University of Colorado,
and I wrote two legal-review style papers on legal liability for forecasts
under US law. One paper was focused on the public sector and the second on the
private sector.
With respect to the
public sector, here is what we concluded
(for the full paper, which includes a discussion of a range of interesting
cases, see it here in PDF):
The decisions reviewed
above indicate that the [Federal Tort Claims Act] likely would preclude most if
not all claims against the federal government based on inaccurate weather
forecasts, especially given the Gaubert decision and the cases applying it in
lawsuits against the NWS for forecast-related claims. Bergquist, Monzon, and
Taylor all recognize that policy factors, such as cost and the desire not to
overwarn, enter into NWS forecasting and warning decisions. However, it would
be too strong a statement to say that the federal government will never face a
liability risk in its forecasting enterprise. In instances where all discretion
has been removed, if other FTCA requirements were met, the government’s failure
to follow a mandatory statute, regulation, or policy could expose it to
liability. Of course, the Supreme Court could alter the Gaubert test to make it
more difficult for the government to seek refuge in the discretionary function
exception.
In short, do good science
and follow the law and there is essentially no risk of legal liability.
Precedent indicates that an inaccurate forecast is not a basis under US law for
a claim of legal liability.
With respect to the
private sector we concluded that the situation is a bit more complicated (full
paper here in PDF):
Lawsuits against private
sector weather forecasters for forecasts may increase in the coming years as
the private sector expands its forecasting activities, especially if companies
make inflated or unfounded claims of their ability to forecast the weather
accurately. Thus, companies have to be cognizant of the trade-offs between
using claims of forecast accuracy as a marketing tool and the exposure to
liability that will result from unfounded claims of capabilities. Absent
statutory immunity or a valid limitation of liability clause, private sector
forecasters who are sued will have to defend lawsuits for inaccurate forecasts
on their merits.
The decisions discussed
above provide some guidance as to how such lawsuits could be resolved. At one
end of the spectrum, forecasters will not be found liable simply because a
forecast is erroneous. Courts in the past have recognized that forecasts are
fallible and people who rely on such forecasts assume the risk that a
particular prediction may not be realized. The issuance of probabilistic
forecasts introduces additional technical considerations (e.g., in evaluating
forecast “goodness”) but does not appear to contradict these general findings
related to liability. At the other end of the spectrum, a forecaster should be
found liable if a forecast was based on a deliberate, knowing falsehood or
withholding of information.
Most cases likely will
fall in a gray area, where it will be alleged that, while the forecast may have
been made in good faith, it strayed from established professional standards.
Rigorous verification of forecasts would offer valuable information to
producers of forecasts about how to market their products honestly, to users of
forecasts about how to use predictive information effectively, and to the court
system when it is called upon to evaluate whether a forecast or forecast
process meets the applicable professional standard.
In summary, our forecast
for the legal liability of private sector forecast providers is “partly
cloudy.” Private sector forecasters should take steps to ensure that their
exposure is limited and insured as much as possible, so that those partly
cloudy skies do not develop into powerful storms.
Even with the additional
complications, it is highly unlikely that a forecaster who relies on
established professional standards in the issuance of a forecast will be found
liable for a poor forecast.
Of course, as in always
the case in legal matters, history may not be a guide to the future and those
future outcomes may deviate from that represented in past US case law. Even so,
in the US scientists would appear to have exceedingly little reason for concern
about legal liability for the issuance of forecasts that do not verify. The
legal situation will of course be different across different countries.
While I certainly
understand the concerns of scientists about legal exposure, the more important
issues raised by the L'Aquila case involve the roles of scientists in policy
and politics, where legal exposure in the Italian context derives from that
larger context, as the more nuanced characterizations of the case have
revealed. The L'Aquila lawsuit is to be appealed, so there will continue to be
opportunities to discuss the particulars of the case and its broader
significance.
Papers cited:
Klein, R and RA Pielke
Jr. 2002, Bad weather? Then sue the weatherman! Part I: Legal liability for
public sector forecasts. Bull. Amer. Meteorol. Soc. 83:1791-1799. (PDF)
Klein, R and RA Pielke
Jr. 2002, Bad weather? Then sue the weatherman! Part II: Legal liability for
private sector forecasts. Bull. Amer. Meteorol. Soc. 83:1801-1807. (PDF)
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